



Exceed with COLT

Exceed with COLT

NGN Architectures, VoIP Security and Protocols

UKNOF 5 25/10/06

Neil J. McRae – Director of Network Architecture

Nico Fischbach – Head of Network Security

COLT Telecom Group

Agenda

What is VoIP?

VoIP Architectures

VoIP Protocols & Security Concerns

Questions

COLT and VoIP

COLT Telecom

- > Voice, Data and Managed Services, Tier 1 ISP in EU
- > 14 countries, 60 cities, 50k business customers
- > 20 000 km of fibre across Europe + DSL

VoIP “experience”


- > 3 major vendor directions
 - One “we're coming from the TDM world”
 - One “we're coming from the IP world”
 - One “we're a VoIP company”
- > Internet and MPLS VPN-based VoIP services
- > Own network (fiber + DSL) and wDSL
- > Going MSPP + VoIP NGN + IMS – TDM scaling issues

What is VoIP? The Customer Viewpoint

Computer with softclient
(SIP or Skype)




Hardphone
(analog or SIP or Skype)




Hosted IP PBX




VoIP/ToIP



PBX Trunking over IP




Wholesale VoIP




POTS

VoIP/ToIP




Softswitch Architecture (Intermediate Architecture)




- > **Softswitch:** it combines the Call Control, the Signalling Gateway and the Media Gateway Control function. Together with the Media Gateway function it provides signalling and media inter-working with the legacy TDM voice network. The intelligence of the system (call control functionality) as well the customer database resides within the softswitch function.
- > **Session Border Control:** it provides secure access control to the customer appliances and mediates between the COLT IMS and any 3rd party IP network
- > **Management and Provisioning:** it is an integrated OSS platform that allows end to end provisioning and management across the technology components.

IMS Architecture (Target Architecture)




- > **Interworking with TDM Voice Network:** it provides signalling and media inter-working with the TDM voice network
- > **Core SIP Call Control:** it is a set of SIP enabled devices that control the flow of SIP messages between the customer appliances (IP phones, soft phones, wireless handhelds) and the rest of the IMS components
- > **Customer Profile Database:** it contains the user identity and the user service profile, providing session authentication and access to service applications
- > **Session Border Control:** it provides secure access control to the customer appliances and mediates between the IMS and any 3rd party IP network
- > **Application Layer:** it provides the service logic, with a set of Application Servers dedicated to specific services (eg an IP Centrex AS for telephony services, a Mobility AS for FMC integration, a Messaging AS for unified messaging and presence services)
- > **IMS Management and Provisioning:** it is an integrated OSS platform that allows end to end provisioning and management across the IMS technology components.


Softswitch Architecture – Logical Level




IMS Architecture – Logical Level





VoIP Core Network Architecture with Security





Nortel

















VoIP Protocols

H.323

- > ITU, ASN.1, CPE/Phone<->Gatekeeper
- > H.225/RAS (1719/UDP) for registration
- > H.225/Q.931 (1720/TCP) for call setup
- > H.245 (>1024/TCP – or over call setup channel) for call management

MGCP (Media Gateway Control Protocol)

- > IETF, Softswitch (CallAgent)<->MGW
- > CallAgents->MGW (2427/UDP)
- > MGW->CallAgents (2727/UDP)
- > Used to control MGWs
- > AoC (Advice Of Charge) towards CPE - **

VoIP Protocols

SIP

- > IETF, HTTP-like
- > Session based – Does anyone here not know what SIP is?
:D

RTP

- > Media stream (one or one per direction)
- > CODECs (G.711{a,u}, G.726, G.729(a))
- > RTCP: control protocol for RTP
- > SRTP: Secure RTP (w/ MiKEY)
- > Often 16000+/UDP or default NAT range, but can be any
UDP > 1024
- > Can be UA <-> UA aka "Free Intersite" or UA <-> MGW <-> UA

H.323 versus SIP

- > The majority of current COLT VoIP products is based on H.323
 - > This is mainly owing to missing functionality on SIP
 - > Questionable interoperability and scalability concerns still exist though (10s of billions of minutes)
 - > SIP not expected to completely replace H.323 in the mid/long term.
 - > Protocols are somewhat complementary- no religion here though!
 - > More detail on the differences
 - > and more insight on understanding of our direction at:
 - > http://www.packetizer.com/voip/h323_vs_sip/
 - > This is expected to change over time

Session Border Controller

What the role of an SBC ?

- > Security
- > Hosted NAT traversal (correct signalling / IP header)
- > Signalling conversion
- > Media Conversion
- > Stateful RTP pin-holing based on signalling

Can be located at different interfaces: Customer/Provider, inside customer LAN, Provider/Provider (VoIP peering)

What can be done on a FW with ALGs ?

What can be done on the end-system ?

Is there a need for a VoIP NIDS (especially with SIP-TLS)?

VoIP Hardware

Mix of software and hardware (mostly DSPs)

- > Softswitch: usually only signalling
- > MGW (Media Gateway): RTP<->TDM, SS7oIP<->SS7
- > IP-PBX: Softswitch+MGW

Operating systems

- > Real-time OSes (QNX/Neutrino, VxWorks, RTLinux)
- > Windows
- > Linux, Solaris

Poor OS hardening

Patch management:

- > OSes not up-to-date
- > Not “allowed” to patch them

Security Challenges


VoIP protocols

- > No, VoIP isn't just SIP
- > SIP is a driver for IMS services and cheap CPEs
- > H.323 and MGCP (still) rock the carrier world

Security issues

- > VoIP dialects
- > Only a couple of OEM VoIP stacks (think x-vendor vulnerabilities)
- > FWs / SBCs: do they solve issues or introduce complexity ?
- > Are we creating backdoors into customer networks ?
- > CPS and QoS

One more backdoor?



VoIP Dialects

No way to firewall / ACL (especially if non-stateful) based on protocol inspection

Vendors who never heard of timeouts and don't send keep-alives

Result :

> Clueful:

- Permit UDP <port range> <identified systems>

> Half clueful:

- Permit UDP <port>1024> any

> Clueless:

- Permit UDP any any

End-result:

- > Own3d via exposed UDP services on COTS systems
- > Who needs RPC services (>1024/UDP) ?

Lawful Intercept

- > Re-use existing solutions: TDM break-out
- > Install a sniffer (signalling & media stream)
- > Re-route calls (but hide it in the signalling)
- > Eavesdropping not a real threat (own network)
- > Enterprise network : Needs to be a part of a global security strategy – How many have this?
 - Clear text e-mail
 - Clear text protocols (HTTP, Telnet, etc)
 - VoIP
 - Etc
- > VoIP over WLAN easy.

Phones and Terminals

IP Phones Reliability

- > Quite easy to crash (weak TCP/IP stacks and buggy software implementation)
- > Mostly an insider threat – How clueful is your cleaner?
 - DHCP server
 - TFTP server (phone configuration)
 - Credentials (login + PIN) – Fraud issues.

VoIP doesn't mean that you need to move to IP Phones

- > PBX with E1 (PRI/BRI) to router and then VoIP
- > PBX with IP interface towards the outside world (but do you really want to put your PBX on the Internet) ?
- > Means that you have to maintain two separate networks, but “solves” the QoS issues on a LAN
- > What about soft clients ?! – All the usual Unix/Windows issues.

Denial of Service

Generic DDoS

- > Not a real issue, you can't talk to our VoIP Core
 - ACLs are complex to maintain use edge-only BGP blackholing
- > We are used to deal with large DDoS attacks :)
 - <http://www.securite.org/presentations/ddos/>

DoS that are more of an issue

- > Generated by customers: not too difficult to trace (IT Clue)
- > Protocol layer DoS : H.323 / MGCP / SIP signalling
 - Replace CPE / use soft-client
 - Inject crap in the in-band signalling (MGCP commands, weird H.323 TPKTs, etc)
 - Get the state machine of the inspection engine either confused or in a block-state, if lucky for the “server” addresses and not the clients – Vendors not really thinking about this.

Security Challenges

Online services

- > Call Management (operator console)
- > IN routing (Fraud potential)
- > Reporting / CDRs

Security issues

- > Multi-tenant capabilities
- > Have the vendors ever heard of web application security ?
- > Who needs security or lawful intercept if a kid can route your voice traffic via SQL injection

WebApp FWs are really required...

Security Challenges

TDM / VoIP : two worlds, two realms, becoming one ?

- > Security by “obscurity” / complexity vs the IP world
- > Fraud detection

Security issues

- > New attack surface for legacy TDM/PSTN networks
- > No security features in old Class4/Class5 equipment
- > No forensics capabilities, no mapping to physical line
- > Spoofing and forging
- > People: Voice Engineers vs Data Engineers vs Security engineers. Engineering vs Operations. Marketing vs Engineering. Conflicts and Time-to-Market

Operational Concerns

VoIP is damn complex

Only way to debug most of the issues: VoiceEng + IP/DataEng + SecurityEng on a bridge/online chat

Requirement: be able to sniff all traffic

Tool: Ethereal/Wireshark

Attacker: Just use any of the protocol decoder flaw in the sniffer

Make sure your sniffers are on R/O SPAN ports, in a DMZ which only allows in-bound VNC/SSH

Do not underestimate the effort on a multi Country setup – What is EU?!

If the guy is really good and can upload a rootkit over RTP: get his CV and offer him a job – you need this guy – serious skills shortage

VoIP Carrier Interconnect

Aka “VoIP peering” / Carrier interconnect

Already in place (TDM connectivity for VoIP carriers/Skype{In, Out})

Connectivity: over the Internet, IX (public/private), MPLS VPN or VPLS (Ethernet)

No end-to-end MPLS VPN, break the VPN and use an IP-IP interface

Hide your infrastructure (topology hiding), use {white, black}listing and make sure only the other carrier can talk to you

Signalling/Media conversion (SBC)

Remember – this isn’t web traffic – its termination money in both directions!

Encryption / Authentication

Do we want to introduce it ?

Vendor X: "We are compliant". Sure.

Vendor Y: "It's on our roadmap". Q1Y31337 ?

Vendor Z: "Why do you need this ?". Hmmmm...

IPsec from CPE to VoIP core

- > Doable (recent HW with CPU or crypto card)
- > What about CPE<->CPE RTP ?
- > Still within RTT / echo-cancellation window

May actually do mobile device<- IPsec ->VoIP core

- > Bad guys can only attack the VPN concentrators
- > No impact on directly connected customers

Still reliability issues in vendor implementations

IMS Security – The Future

IMS = IP Multimedia Subsystem

Remember when the mobile operators built their WAP and 3G networks ?

- > Mostly “open” (aka terminal is trusted)
- > Even connected with their “internal”/IT network

IMS services with MVNOs, 3G/4G: overly complex architecture with tons of interfaces

Large attack surface: registration/tracking servers, application servers, etc

Firewalling: complex if not impossible

Next thing to try: Attack Fixed<->Mobile handover (GSM<->WiFi)

Questions?